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Environmental Inequalities and Democratic Citizenship: Linking Norma-
tive Theory with Empirical Research1 
 
Fabian Schuppert (Queen's Belfast) and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (Zurich) 
 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to link empirical findings concerning environmental inequal-
ities with different normative yard-sticks for assessing whether these inequalities should be 
deemed unjust, or not. We argue that such an inquiry must necessarily take into account some 
caveats regarding both empirical research and normative theory. We suggest that empirical 
results must be contextualised by establishing geographies of risk. As a normative yard-stick 
we propose a moderately demanding social-egalitarian account of justice and democratic citi-
zenship, which we take to be best suited to identify unjust as well as legitimate instances of 
socio-environmental inequality. 
 
Introduction 
Within the literature on environmental justice one can find a wide variety of claims concerning 
the relationship between people's socio-economic status, their natural and social environment, 
and impacts on their health and well-being. These claims cover the entire spectrum from scep-
tical to alarmist, since there exists significant disagreement regarding the indicators, measures 
and results different empirical studies on environmental justice produce. While the majority of 
researchers agree that certain forms of environmental inequalities exist, it is a contested issue 
both whether these inequalities are harmful and thus unjust and whether existing empirical 
                                                            
1 The authors would like to thank Anton Leist, Jörg Rössel, Michael Stauffacher, and Gordon Walker for very 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The authors also would like to acknowledge financial support 
from the Stiftung Mercator Switzerland, the URPP (University Research Priority Program) Ethics at the Univer-
sity of Zurich and the Institute for Collaborative Research in the Humanities at Queen’s University Belfast. 
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research allows us to draw any general conclusions from rather localised studies. In fact, even 
the name of the field of study is somewhat a misnomer, since most studies in the literature 
investigate environmental inequalities and environmental factors as well as their effects, rather 
than environmental (in)justice per se. 
 Moreover, the normative concepts used are also ripe with controversy. In many cases 
it is utterly unclear what states of affairs on the basis of which grounds should be labelled 
injustices, or how different normative concepts such as well-being, equality and justice are 
connected to each other. However, as long as we do not clearly identify the normative yard-
sticks we use, any normative assessment of existing empirical research ultimately will be 
flawed. 
This paper is an attempt to provide one possible answer to the question of when certain 
environmental inequalities should be considered unjust. Our aim is to link empirical research 
with normative theory in order to critically analyse the possible impact of environmental ine-
qualities on people's right to democratic citizenship. As we will argue, harmful environmental 
inequalities can be identified by contextualising empirical findings and by paying special at-
tention to people's often multiple and cumulative social vulnerabilities, which are indicators 
for existing geographies of risk. Moreover, some environmental inequalities can indeed in-
fringe upon people's right to democratic citizenship. However, in order to decide whether dif-
ferent environmental inequalities and their effects present cases of injustice, we need to set out 
the normative criteria we are operating with, since different theories of justice and democratic 
citizenship will yield very different results.   
The paper will first flag up some key caveats which make answering the question of 
whether environmental inequalities negatively affect people's right to democratic citizenship 
so difficult. Second, we will review some of the key findings from the empirical literature 
concerning the negative effects of environmental inequality on health. As will become clear, 
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in order to fully grasp the extent and complexity of existing environmental inequalities we need 
to contextualise the environmental justice debate within wider inquiries on socioeconomic in-
equality and its harmful effects, establishing distinct geographies of risk. Third, we will briefly 
review different conceptions of justice and democratic citizenship, as well as their underlying 
normative requirements. As will become clear in section four, the normative assessment of 
geographies of risk through our democracy-theoretic lens very much depends on the normative 
ideal of democratic citizenship and its underlying conditions of justice we employ. We will use 
three different readings of justice and democratic citizenship in order to assess when environ-
mental inequalities become environmental injustices. In so doing, we will argue that a moder-
ately demanding theory of justice and democratic citizenship is best suited for this endeavour 
and that it allows us to distinguish unjust environmental inequalities from unobjectionable 
ones.  
 
1. Linking Empirical Research and Normative Theory: Some Caveats and Notes of 
Caution 
Empirical research offers normative theorists a wide set of results on the existence and possible 
impacts of environmental inequality, while normative theory provides empirical researchers 
with a well-stocked tool-box for evaluating results. However, as noted in the introduction, sig-
nificant disagreement exists over the correct interpretation of existing data sets and the nature 
of different normative concepts. Therefore, before analysing the existing literatures and trying 
to link them, it is necessary to highlight some issues and caveats concerning both empirical 
research and normative accounts of justice and democratic citizenship.  
 With regard to the empirical literature on environmental (in)justice we can distinguish 
at least three areas of controversy which should be interpreted as notes of caution against draw-
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ing hasty conclusions: definitional issues, measurement issues and issues of particularism. Sim-
ilarly, normative theory faces definitional issues, too, as well as issues concerning its tendency 
to overgeneralise and abstract. Let us briefly explain the nature and scope of these issues. 
 
1.1. Definitional issues in empirical studies and normative theory 
The field of environmental justice research faces a range of controversial definitional issues, 
since even the basic parameters of the debate are contested. What do we for instance mean by 
'environment' and 'environmental factors'? Environmental factors can include a wide range of 
things and phenomena, including 'pollutants, toxins, noise, and crowding as well as exposure 
to settings such as housing, schools, work environments, and neighbourhoods' (Evans and 
Kantrowitz 2002, 303). Depending on which factors we see as environmental, our analysis will 
vary.  
The same holds true for our conception of what counts as justice and injustice. Within 
the literature on environmental inequality justice as a concept is used loosely and inconsistently 
(an observation also made by Walker 2012; Walker 2009; Downey 2005). However, this is in 
part due to the ambivalence in the normative literature, as well as the variety of partially con-
tradicting definitions and conceptions of justice available (which we will return to in section 
three). This definitional uncertainty obviously matters significantly, since the justice frame-
work we employ for our analysis determines our assessment; a strictly distributional under-
standing of justice will pick up on other factors than a justice framework which includes pro-
cedural issues, well-being, or recognition (Schlosberg 2009; Schlosberg 2004; Ikeme 2003).  
Moreover, many empirical studies seem to equate inequality with injustice, which is 
problematic from a normative point of view (Walker et al. 2005, 361). In fact, as mentioned 
earlier, even though the field of research is commonly called 'environmental justice' research, 
we think it is better to speak in the first instance about environmental (in)equality, since most 
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studies deal with differences in environmental quality, vulnerability and the distribution of risk. 
Whether all these empirical inequalities are unjust is a different question. Thus, in the interest 
of analytical clarity, for the remainder of the paper, we will use the term environmental ine-
quality rather than environmental justice. 
 
1.2. Measurement and particularism issues in empirical research 
Empirical studies on environmental inequality differ widely in what they measure, how they 
measure it, how they frame the indicators and results, and what kind of conclusions they allow 
for. That is to say, not only is it difficult to compare results because of an absence of standard-
ised study designs (Sahsuvaroglu and Jerrett 2007, 243), but studies also are of varying quality 
and scientific rigour (Bowen 2002). Under the overarching motto of environmental justice 
studies look at a wide array of phenomena and indicators, including the distribution of poten-
tially and actually hazardous sites, the distribution of so-called risk factors, spatial differences 
in environmental quality, health impacts, correlations between varying factors, such as socio-
economic status and exposure to toxins, to name but a few. Thus, these studies offer a wealth 
of information but it is necessary to critically question what kind of inequality exactly the dif-
ferent studies measure, since proximity to a waste site is very different from exposure to toxins, 
which in turn is different from observable health impacts (Walker et al. 2005, 361).  
Furthermore, most studies are limited in scope since they use particular indicators 
within a particular space. In other words, many studies look only at a particular city or a mu-
nicipality and they use data sets which are easy to access such as average income (as a short-
hand for socio-economic status), postcodes (as a short-hand for socially stratified groups), or 
mortality rates (as a short-hand for severe health impacts). Needless to say, many of these data 
sets are somewhat arbitrary and they operate at a certain level of abstraction, grouping individ-
uals into larger clusters. Therefore, it would be dangerous to generalize results from a particular 
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municipality to an entire country (Bowen 2002). Similarly, some studies seem to commit a 
fallacy by trying to infer generalisations about the status of individuals from data sets which 
are limited to specific groups or neighbourhoods (Anderson 2009).  
Most people doing empirical research on environmental inequalities are of course aware 
of these issues, and we did not mention them in order to discredit empirical research; not at all. 
Instead, our aim was to highlight the difficulty of using individual empirical studies in order to 
arrive at sound normative judgments concerning the possible existence and status of environ-
mental inequalities and injustices. 
 
1.3. Generalisation and abstraction issues in normative theory 
While empirical studies in the field of environmental justice thus are often rather limited in 
their scope, many normative theories suffer from the opposite problem; normative accounts are 
often based on abstraction and are aimed at establishing universal principles. The problem with 
this mode of operation is twofold and similar to the caveats mentioned before concerning em-
pirical inquiries: first, since most normative theories utilise several sub-concepts for establish-
ing their definition of justice, or democratic citizenship, or whatever, the resulting theory is 
loaded with definitional assumptions and abstractions; second, using universal principles, for 
instance, for distinguishing between unjust actions and just actions can run into problems if 
each action is assessed individually without taking its context into account. Here are two ex-
amples to illustrate both these points. 
 First, if one were to define an injustice as an action which harms another person, one 
has a host of questions to address, or one needs to buy into rough and ready answers to these 
questions which means buying into a whole range of assumptions and abstractions. Thus, in 
the case of 'injustice is harming another person', the questions one would need to answer would 
include (but are not limited to): What do we mean by harm; is there a difference between action 
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and inaction; does it matter whether one intended to harm the other, or not? So, using the above 
mentioned definition of injustice does not deliver – as some authors assume – a clear normative 
yard-stick, but it is in many ways only the top of the iceberg. 
 Second, often the deontic status of an act depends on the circumstances of that act. A 
universal principle like 'an action is only unjust if it directly harms somebody' might prove 
unhelpful if we deal with cases of cumulative harm, such as environmental pollution or green-
house gas emissions. First, it is not at all clear that pollution and emitting as such is an injustice. 
Every human being must emit at least to a minimal amount to fulfil its everyday needs and to 
survive. Second, individual acts of pollution and emissions by one individual do in most cir-
cumstances not lead to any harm. It is the over-accumulation of both which harms. Third, these 
harms, however, are not necessarily harms befalling currently living persons. In several cases 
they concern future not yet existing persons which might or might not come into existence. 
This raises another obvious (but difficult to answer) question: is it really possible to harm future 
people? 
 Both these examples show why it is good to carefully analyse the normative categories 
one wants to use for assessing empirical results, since subscribing to simple one-principle so-
lutions will often prove detrimental to the overall validity of one's argument. Normative theory 
is a linguistic minefield and it is crucial to be aware of normative theory's shortcomings before 
passing judgment on whether a particular state of affairs presents an injustice or not. 
 
More generally speaking, when empirical researchers want to learn from normative theorists 
and vice versa, they should be careful not to oversimplify the contributions available in the 
other field or to look for answers which normative theory / empirical research just cannot pro-
vide. With these caveats in mind, let us take a look at some key findings we can take away 
from the existing empirical literature on environmental inequalities. 
8 / 35 
 
2. Insights from Empirical Research on Environmental Inequalities 
As mentioned earlier, empirical research provides such a wide range of results that it would be 
impossible to discuss all of them here. Instead, within our analysis of existing empirical re-
search on environmental justice we will focus on studies which investigate the nexus between 
people's socio-economic status (SES), environmental quality and discernible health and well-
being impacts. While the study of the complex nexus between SES, environmental factors and 
health still faces many challenges (Bell et al. 2005), highlighting the interrelationship between 
people's SES, environment and health allows for interesting cross-fertilisation with research on 
social epidemiology, social vulnerability and the social gradient in health. As we will see, our 
framing of the literature is conducive to identifying the multiple and cumulative effects of dif-
ferent socio-environmental factors on people's overall vulnerability, health and well-being. 
  
2.1 Environmental Inequalities and Health 
The nexus between environmental factors and health is well established. For example, air qual-
ity and exposure to particulate matter air pollution have significant effects on people's health, 
including the respiratory system and heart diseases (Kampa and Castanas 2008; Koton et al. 
2013; Myers et al. 2013). A wide range of studies shows (Anderson 2009, 145; Hoffmann et 
al. 2009; Chaix 2006; O’Neill et al. 2003; Kingham, Pearce, and Zawar-Reza 2007) that an 
inverse relation exists between a neighbourhood's socio-economic position and its air quality, 
though there are differences with regard to the strength and reliability of this inverse relation-
ship, depending on the geographical space the study refers to and the measures it employs. 
Moreover, there are some exceptions to this rule (e.g. Forastiere et al. 2007), which established 
that higher SES actually meant higher exposure to air pollution. Interestingly though, the study 
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showing these exceptions still found that areas with lower SES were particularly vulnerable to 
higher particulate air pollution.2  
What is important for our analysis here, though, is that the nexus SES - air quality seems 
to be well enough established to be a mere coincidence. In fact, there seems sufficient evidence 
to claim both 'that those with lower education, income, or employment status have higher risk 
[of cumulative and multiple exposure to environmental impacts and] of death' (Bell, Zanobetti, 
and Dominici 2013, 865) and that across the European Union a social gradient in air pollution 
exposure exists (Kohlhuber et al. 2006), even though available data sets are somewhat incom-
plete and limited in scope. 
 
2.2 Geographies of Exposure, Vulnerability and Risk 
Several studies show that environmental inequalities often cut across a whole range of factors, 
including (multiple) proximity to waste and hazardous sites, exposure to toxins and pollution, 
increased vulnerability due to lower and/or inadequate safety mechanisms and infrastructure, 
as well as higher social and biological susceptibility (Jerrett and Finkelstein 2005; Walker 
2009; Walker et al. 2005; Hornberg and Pauli 2007). Against this background, rather than ex-
clusively focusing on particular environmental inequalities, then, we should be sensitive to 
existing geographies of risk (Jerrett and Finkelstein 2005; Walker 2009), or 'risk-scapes' (Mo-
rello-Frosch and Shenassa 2006; Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd 2001), and engage in care-
ful cumulative risk-assessment factoring in socio-economic inequalities, social vulnerabilities, 
exposure to environmental risks and hazards, as well as biological susceptibility (Morello-
Frosch et al. 2011).  
                                                            
2 The study by Forastiere et al. (2007) raises the issue of the difference between exposure, risk, susceptibility 
and health impact (Walker et al. 2005; O’Neill et al. 2003). This is an issue we will discuss further below. 
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 Geographies of risk are established by combining the results of two other geographies: 
geographies of exposure and geographies of vulnerability. In other words, in order to properly 
identify complex patterns of unequal risk distribution and their associated negative impacts, 
we have to construct geographies of exposure alongside with geographies of vulnerability 
which in conjunction allow us to establish geographies of risk (Jerrett and Finkelstein 2005).3 
But what exactly is meant by these geographies, what do they track and tell us, and why do 
they matter for our normative analysis? 
If we take our bearings from the empirical literature on the nexus SES – air pollution, 
we can see that socio-economic inequalities and their associated vulnerabilities have a huge 
impact on people's vulnerability and social susceptibility to environmental risks (Fairburn, But-
ler, and Smith 2009). On top of that, it is a fact that many vulnerable groups are exposed to 
multiple and cumulative risks which leads to a strong socio-environmental gradient in health 
and well-being (Morello-Frosch et al. 2011; Fairburn, Butler, and Smith 2009; Evans and 
Kantrowitz 2002; Walker 2009). However, any mono-causal analyses of this nexus would fall 
short, since proximity does not determine health impacts, and exposure must be analysed in 
conjunction with and not separate from susceptibility and vulnerability (Makri and Stilianakis 
2008).4 Since the causes of most social and environmental inequalities are multifactorial, we 
argue that any normative assessment should be sensitive to all three issues; exposure, vulnera-
bility and overall risk (which includes susceptibility issues). First, we establish who is exposed 
and who is vulnerable, giving us geographies of exposure and vulnerability. Then we use these 
insights to establish geographies of risk. 
 
                                                            
3 While our analysis concerning geographies of risk is indebted to Jerrett's and Finkelstein's work, it is important 
to note that we define the different geographies in a slightly different way than Jerrett and Finkelstein and with 
an alternative purpose in mind. We will come back to this point below. 
4 Similarly, those who emit do not necessarily suffer the consequences in terms of reduced air quality and health 
impacts (Mitchell and Dorling 2003). 
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Geographies of exposure map out to what kind of environmental factors a person is, or 
groups of people are (depending on the level of one's analysis), exposed to. Geographies of 
exposure track factors such as air and water quality, noise pollution, levels of radiation and the 
like. This suggests that geographies of exposure focus primarily on actual environmental fac-
tors a person or group is subject to. In addition, geographies of exposure also record proximity 
to high-risk sites, such as toxic waste facilities. However, as we will see in our discussion in 
section four, exposure is unlikely to be relevantly tracked by one's normative theory, unless 
one subscribes to an overly rigid account of equal democratic citizenship. Actual geographies 
of exposure, meanwhile, provide an important indicator for establishing – in conjunction with 
geographies of vulnerability – geographies of risk. 
Geographies of vulnerability, meanwhile, map out a person's or a group's combined 
social, economic and political vulnerabilities. We propose to treat vulnerability as such a wide 
category in order to get a better understanding of the various factors and circumstances which 
influence a person's or group's capacity to deal with harms and unexpected changes. In so do-
ing, our conception of geographies of vulnerability goes beyond mere geographies of suscep-
tibility, which are used in classical environmental inequality research. Social inequalities are 
complex and multi-factorial, spanning a wide spectrum of issues such as housing quality, ac-
cess to health care, availability of social capital, wealth and income. These social inequalities 
significantly affect people's susceptibility, as well as people's capacity to avoid exposure in the 
first place, because economic and political inequalities often go hand in hand with other social 
inequalities. Vulnerability, then, is a function of a person’s (or group’s) (in)capacity to respond 
– in light of her (or its) social, political, biological and economic status - to harms, unexpected 
changes and negative outcomes. Establishing geographies of vulnerability allows us to track 
this complex and multifaceted nexus. 
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Geographies of risk, meanwhile, pick up on overlaps and correlations between geogra-
phies of exposure and geographies of vulnerability, creating thus 'risk-scapes', that is, detailed 
mappings of a person's or a group's socio-political and environmental vulnerability and expo-
sure to risk. In short, geographies of risk allow us to see which groups in a given society/re-
gion/municipality are particularly at risk to suffer or de facto do suffer from the adverse effects 
of socio-environmental inequalities. By contextualising the data from environmental inequality 
research within wider research on socio-economic inequalities and political disenfranchise-
ment, geographies of risk deliver a clear picture of the nature and scope of inequalities in soci-
etal risk distribution and its associated ill-effects on factors such as health and well-being. 
For policy-oriented normative theorists these empirical findings and their associated 
geographies prove invaluable. As Breena Holland (2008, 319) observes, exposure and vulner-
ability to environmental risks influences factors such as health which might significantly im-
pact on what a person does and can be, especially if we factor in the possibility of premature 
death. However, in order to distinguish between trivial inequalities in exposure and risk (since 
perfect equality seems simply unattainable) and objectionable unjust inequalities, theorists 
need a normative yard-stick against which to measure empirical studies and their often tentative 
normative terminology. From our viewpoint of justice and democratic citizenship the question 
arises of which inequalities prove objectionable and on which grounds. Phrased differently, 
having established geographies of risk we now need well justified normative theories which 
clarify whether certain socio-environmental inequalities undermine people's status as free and 
equal citizens (e.g. through undermining people's right to political participation or misrecog-
nizing people's claims to equal citizenship) (Schlosberg 2004, 529). 
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3. Clarifying Normative Theory: Three Accounts of Justice and Democratic Citizenship 
In order to asses in section four which socio-environmental inequalities prove objectionable 
from the viewpoint of justice and democratic citizenship we must first determine what we mean 
when we use the terms 'justice' and 'democratic citizenship'. Before we do so, however, we 
should explain why we choose for our analysis a democracy-focused angle. On our view there 
are four good reasons to approach the issue of environmental inequalities through the lens of 
democratic citizenship. First, the environmental justice literature had from its very birth a deep 
concern with the unequal distribution of environmental risks and burdens along racial and class 
lines, criticising established practices as treating racial minorities and socially lower classes as 
second-class citizens or worse. Second, an explicit analysis of how and why the right to dem-
ocratic citizenship can be undermined by environmental inequalities is most often missing in 
this debate. Third, social psychological justice research suggests that in many instances – de-
pending on context – procedural aspects to decide the distribution of benefits and burdens bears 
greater relevance than the degree of rightness of the eventual outcomes (e.g. Brockner and 
Wiesenfeld 1996; Hauenstein, McGonigle and Flinder 2001). Furthermore, it can be argued 
that in cases in which, due to technical or safety reasons, no fully just distribution of risks is 
possible legitimacy is key for securing acceptance of the distributive outcome (Krütli et al. 
forthcoming). Therefore, democratic citizenship seems to be a promising lens for investigating 
environmental inequalities. 
However, as stated in section one, we need to be aware of the caveats concerning nor-
mative theory, particularly the contentious issue of defining concepts like justice and demo-
cratic citizenship. We need to be careful not to subscribe blindly to a particular conception of 
justice and democratic citizenship, which in a question begging manner predetermines which 
socio-environmental inequalities are deemed unjust. Therefore, prior to answering the question 
of whether a certain state of affairs is unjust it is important to introduce some vocabulary and 
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to make clear what different understandings of justice and of the interrelation between justice 
and the entitlement to free and equal citizenship can be found in the literature. Since the liter-
ature on these topics is too wide to be adequately covered in this section, we will focus on three 
paradigmatic accounts of justice and democratic citizenship. Before that, however, we must 
explain in a bit more detail wherein the contested definitional issues concerning justice and 
democratic citizenship lie. 
 
3.1 Justice, Democracy and Three Accounts of Citizenship 
Most normative political theories of justice and democratic citizenship subscribe to the basic 
idea that a just society is a society in which all members are free and equals. As Ronald 
Dworkin (2000, 1) – amongst others – has famously pointed out, treating others as equals 
should not be mistaken for postulating that we should always treat all people equally (in a strict 
materially distributive sense). Accordingly, we centrally have to distinguish between equal 
treatment and treatment as equals; simply giving everyone an equal slice when distributing a 
cake without any regard for needs or desert or any other criterion would mean to treat all 
equally. If we were to distribute the cake on the basis of how well-off people are, or how much 
they have contributed to baking the cake, we would – in some way at least – treat all as equals. 
However, what it exactly means that all members of a society are treated as equals is a contested 
issue in normative theory, since there exists disagreement over the criteria with regard to which 
all members of society should be treated as equals. 
Similar disagreement exists with regard to the institutional requirements of a function-
ing democracy and the basis for democratic citizenship. That is to say, even though most the-
ories in normative political philosophy agree with the above-mentioned definition of a just 
society, i.e. that it is a society in which all are free and equal, what this entails with regard to 
the political institutions of that society and the socio-economic basis of citizenship is highly 
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controversial. Moreover, while most theories also agree that democracy provides us with a 
political system in which - at least in theory - all are not only equal but also free, the exact 
definition of democracy and its preconditions are the subjects of heated debates. In its most 
basic form, democracy can be defined as a system in which all members of society (should) 
have an equal say or be able to participate as equals in collective decision-making. This status 
of each individual to be able to participate as an equal in collective decision-making is referred 
to as democratic equality, or democratic citizenship.  
On top of these definitional controversies within theories of justice and theories of de-
mocracy, there also exists disagreement over the exact relationship between justice and democ-
racy.5 Is democracy prior to justice, in that only democratic decisions among equals can deter-
mine what should count as just? Or is democracy derivative of justice, meaning that democratic 
decisions can only claim legitimacy as long as these decisions do not conflict with the basic 
principles of justice?  
For our discussion here we take the idea that each and every member of society should 
enjoy equal social status as our starting point, since it seems to act as a common denominator 
amongst the most convincing and important existing theories of justice and democratic citizen-
ship. In so doing, we assume that justice and democracy are intricately linked, since a just 
society is a society of equals, which entails that all members of society should have a say in 
collective decision-making. At the same time, democratic decisions – even though all had their 
say in arriving at a certain decision – should not undermine the basic equal status of all mem-
bers of society. Thus, for the purpose of the following discussion of the three paradigmatic 
accounts of justice and democratic citizenship we will presume that a) all members of a society 
should be respected and treated as equals, and b) that differences in basic social status, as in 
                                                            
5 Even though for most readers it is probably somewhat intuitively clear that justice and democracy should go 
hand-in-hand, in normative theory the analysis of the relationship between justice and democracy is not only 
controversial but it has also been somewhat neglected. Important exceptions include van Parijs (1996, 2011); 
Dowding et al. (2004); Christiano (2004, 2010); Gould (2004); Wall (2007); Pettit (2012); Valentini (2012). 
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caste societies or in slavery-based societies, are unjustifiable or illegitimate, as well as c) that 
all members of society should have – qua democratic citizenship – the right to participate as 
equals in collective decision-making.  
As will become clear, though, despite this basic agreement, the three possible accounts 
we discuss arrive at very different conclusions. So let us now turn our attention to three para-
digmatic accounts of justice and democratic citizenship, namely, the formal-procedural ac-
count, the comprehensive-substantive account, and the moderately demanding social-egalitar-
ian account. While these three accounts are obviously abstractions and so-to-speak ideal types, 
analysing their normative underpinnings and consequences will allow us to assess in the fol-
lowing section which environmental inequalities, respectively which geographies of risk 
should be considered unjust and for which reasons. 
 
3.2. The formal-procedural account 
The formal-procedural account of justice and democratic citizenship focuses on the protection 
of a range of basic rights as well as people's associated liberties. Thus, for champions of this 
account equality is best understood as referring to the formal and legal rights each and every 
citizen enjoys, such as the right to life, the right to vote, and all the other rights which are 
normally considered basic rights.6 The underlying idea is that these equal rights are an essential 
aspect of securing people's basic liberties. In other words, most champions of the formal-pro-
cedural account base their theory on and around the commitment to people's liberty in the sense 
of the absence of unjustified interference.7 Hence, defenders of the formal-procedural account 
                                                            
6 Other rights which are commonly assumed to be basic rights include the right to freedom of thought, the right 
to freedom of association, the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of movement, the right to due 
process and the like. 
7 This way of specifying the understanding of liberty used in this paradigmatic account is based upon Isaiah Ber-
lin’s description of so-called ‘negative liberty’ (Berlin 1969).  
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commonly argue against major state interventions since that would interfere with people's lib-
erty to live their own life according to their own conceptions of the good.  
The formal-procedural account assumes that once people's basic rights and associated 
liberties are protected and as long as every member has the right to vote and participate in 
political decision-making all ensuing states of affairs are legitimate and just. The formal-pro-
cedural account of justice thus holds to a rather libertarian understanding of what it means to 
treat and respect all members of society as equals. Accordingly, this account claims that all are 
treated as equals as long as their basic formal rights and liberties are protected and equality 
before the law is secured, since it is only these forms of equality which are needed in order to 
protect every citizen's liberty to live as he/she sees fit. 
 Similarly, the formal-procedural account holds that democratic citizenship for all 
amounts to safeguarding every citizen's right to vote and to participate in collective decision-
making. Since the underlying normative commitment of most champions of the formal-proce-
dural account is to individual liberty, securing democratic citizenship is chiefly seen as an issue 
of ensuring equal legal status for all. In other words, the legitimacy of democratic decisions is 
primarily determined procedurally; if all members of society had the right to vote and the right 
to participate in the decision-making process democratic decisions are deemed legitimate as 
long as they do not violate the equal legal status of all, as defined above.8  
 In short, the formal-procedural account emphasizes the formal equal status of all citi-
zens and it advances a libertarian understanding of the institutional requirements of a just so-
ciety. As long as people's basic formal rights and liberties are secured, people should have the 
freedom to decide for themselves and the state should stay out of it. In consequence, democratic 
                                                            
8 Put differently, what is important for equal citizenship according to the formal-procedural account is that all 
can express their interests in a non-discriminatory voting procedure. Aggregating these different interests to find 
where the majority lies within society then leads to legitimate policy decisions. Classical statements of this view 
have been established by Norberto Bobbio (1987) and Robert Dahl (1989). 
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decision-making is limited to the sphere which does not infringe upon individual liberties.9 At 
the same time this account puts high emphasis on the formal legitimacy of political decisions. 
As long as all had the formal right and possibility to participate in decision-making and their 
formal rights and liberties are protected by the decision taken, any decision must be accepted 
as legitimate irrespective of whether the inequalities it establishes could be considered harmful 
or objectionable. 
 
3.3. The comprehensive-substantive account 
While the formal-procedural account advances a 'hands-off' mentality, the comprehensive-sub-
stantive account is at the other end of the spectrum. Champions of the comprehensive-substan-
tive account are normally first and foremost committed to ensuring each and every citizen's 
substantive social equality, a task which can only be accomplished if democratic processes and 
people's free interactions are effectively regulated (van Parijs 1996, 2011; Arneson 2004; Wall 
2007).10 However, this is not to say that defenders of the comprehensive-substantive account 
would be subscribing to an illiberally paternalist state or anything the like. Instead, champions 
of the comprehensive-substantive account are most often relatively strict (comprehensive) 
egalitarians, that is, they argue that a just society only treats its members as equals if all achieve 
more or less equal living conditions, and if all enjoy equal opportunities and control roughly 
equal amounts of resources.11 
                                                            
9 This is the reason why this account can also be labelled – following David Held – protective democracy or le-
gal democracy (Held 2006, Chap. 3, 201ff.). Champions of the protective view are thought to include such clas-
sical authors as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Charles Montesquieu. The most prominent champions of legal 
democracy are, according to Held, Friedrich von Hayek (1960) and Robert Nozick (1974) both libertarian theo-
rists of justice. This is the reason why this account has a close affinity with libertarianism. In democratic theory, 
however, the views we have in mind here are often treated under the label ‘liberal democracy’ which is in ten-
sion with how liberalism is understood in the domain of social justice research.  
10 In fact, in some parts of the egalitarian literature one gets the impression that achieving just distributions takes 
precedence over concerns for whether bringing about these distributions had been democratically legitimised in 
the first place. 
11 To be sure, proponents of such an account disagree on how the three forms of equality mentioned must be un-
derstood and whether or not all three forms are necessary for a just society. The main point, though, is not that 
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 What is important for our discussion here is that the comprehensive-substantive account 
construes the range (or scope) of justice to be much wider and deeper than the formal-proce-
dural account. For defenders of the comprehensive-substantive account treating all members 
of society as equals and respecting their equal status requires much more than protecting every 
person's basic formal rights and liberties. Accordingly, the comprehensive-substantive account 
holds that people cannot interact as equals if they are not substantively equal, that is, also with 
respect to the material holdings they have, the opportunities they enjoy, the welfare they 
achieve and the relationships they stay in. Obviously this is a very tall order and to make people 
in a comprehensive way substantively equal requires large-scale redistribution and would - 
with regard to existing political institutions - demand major institutional changes.  
Moreover, this commitment to a strongly egalitarian ideal also influences this account's 
conception of democratic citizenship. According to the comprehensive-substantive account, 
democratic citizenship does not only require that people enjoy the right to vote and to partici-
pate in collective decision-making, but it also requires that people enjoy shared control, as well 
roughly equal authority and influence. However, because of its demanding conception of jus-
tice, the comprehensive-substantive account also restricts the scope of democratic decisions 
more heavily than the formal-procedural account, since any decisions which undermine the 
comprehensively and substantively equal status of all members of society will be deemed either 
illegitimate or at least in need of revision (van Parijs, 1996; 2011; Arneson, 2004).  
 
3.4. The moderately demanding social-egalitarian account 
The moderately demanding social-egalitarian account holds that the equal social status of all 
members of society is only protected if people do not only enjoy equal rights, but if they also 
                                                            
champions of this account favour all of these three kinds of equality but that they advance a more comprehen-
sive and substantive vision of a just society than champions of the formal-procedural account. 
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enjoy sufficient resources and if people stand in broadly egalitarian relationships to each other. 
Similarly, people only enjoy equal democratic citizenship if they do not only enjoy the formal 
rights to vote and participate in collective decision making, but if they also are not subject to 
socio-political domination or status-undermining structural inequalities.12  
 In contrast to the comprehensive-substantive account, however, champions of this ac-
count leave more room for collective decision-making. According to their view, most claims 
about justice and its principles depend on whether or not they can be legitimated through pro-
cesses of collective decision-making. But as these processes presuppose an equal standing of 
all citizens, policy decisions are strictly restricted by the substantive conditions necessary to 
secure free and equal citizenship.13 On the other hand, according to this account many claims 
of justice must depend on the consent of citizens, that is, many questions regarding justice must 
be settled through procedurally fair democratic mechanisms, under conditions of equal citizen-
ship. 
 Therefore, equal respect for individual interests can only be ensured if not only an au-
thority (some citizens) determines which political decisions are taken, but if all citizens ‘on 
whom the rules have a major impact’ are equally involved in determining political decisions 
(Christiano 2010, 56). This means that decisions about distributing burdens and benefits within 
society must be, in some way or other, justifiable to all members of a society, for instance 
through satisfying the demands of public reason (Habermas 1997; Rawls 1993). Put differently, 
what is important for democratic citizenship is that no-one is arbitrarily dominated by someone 
else (Pettit 1997, 69). Thus, in collective decision-making political power must be shared and 
all must have effective opportunities to influence policy decisions. This makes it necessary that 
respective substantive conditions of equality are secured for all citizens.  
                                                            
12 See for instance Elizabeth Anderson (1999). 
13 Variations of this view include Gould (2004); Brettschneider (2005); Christiano (2010); Pettit (2012); . 
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 The moderately demanding social-egalitarian account thus has two important parts; on 
the one hand, it sees a whole range of socio-economic inequalities as incompatible with the 
ideal of equal democratic citizenship, since socio-economic inequalities often go hand-in-hand 
with domination, unequal political influence and harmful differences in social status. On the 
other hand, the social-egalitarian account also places certain limits on the range of possible 
outcomes from democratic decision-making, namely, in cases in which democratic decisions 
undermine people's status as free and equal citizens. This feature of the moderately demanding 
social-egalitarian account is particularly interesting since the account also affirms the authority 
of democracy, by arguing that ‘socially not unjust’ inequalities can be legitimated through 
democratic consent.14 
 
Viewed in light of these three paradigmatic accounts of justice and democratic citizenship it 
becomes clear that whether or not multiple socio-environmental risks are objectionable does 
not only depend on whether they undermine the entitlement to free and equal citizenship; it 
also highly depends on the normative framing, that is, which account of justice and democratic 
citizenship one employs. How these differences in assessing socio-environmental inequalities 
bear relevance, and what – if any – standards of socio-environmental justice can be argued for 
as fundamental to guarantee free and equal citizenship, are the questions to which we now turn. 
 
4. Assessing the Normative Status of Socio-Environmental Inequalities 
Depending on what normative convictions back the assessment of socio-environmental ine-
qualities and their impact on the entitlement to free and equal democratic citizenship, the inter-
pretations of empirical results will vary. In this section, we will apply the three accounts of 
                                                            
14 We used here the somewhat awkward term 'socially not unjust' rather than just, in order to show that not all 
inequalities which are not as a matter of principle unjust must be on the social-egalitarian account fully just. In 
fact, leaving room for debate on issues such as this is, in our view, one of the core strength of the social-egalitar-
ian account. 
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justice and democratic citizenship introduced in section three, in order to assess the empirical 
results we introduced in section two. As we will see, the results vary significantly. 
 In section two we argued that the assessment of environmental inequalities is best done 
through the identification of geographies of risk comprising the significant overlaps between 
exposure to environmental impacts and socio-economic vulnerability. For our normative as-
sessment these overlaps are most significant because if disadvantage in exposure and disad-
vantage in socio-economic status coincide we have good reasons to assume that we indeed 
have identified an environmental injustice. In other words, while socio-economic segregation 
in a society might be objectionable from the viewpoint of social justice more generally speak-
ing, in order to call something an environmental injustice, we obviously will have to link socio-
economic inequalities to environmental issues, such as for example high exposure to pollution.   
 Let us now, with these considerations in mind, look at how the three paradigmatic ac-
counts of justice and democratic citizenship will assess the environmental inequalities dis-
cussed in section two. We will see that our democratic-theoretic lens proves most helpful if we 
adopt the moderately-demanding social-egalitarian account. The formal-procedural account by 
contrast allows, in most cases, only for a limited critical assessment of any environmental ine-
qualities since as long as people’s basic formal rights are not undermined these inequalities 
prove - from the viewpoint of formal-procedural justice and citizenship - unobjectionable. The 
comprehensive-substantive account on the other hand is too demanding; it takes virtually all 
environmental inequalities to be unjust and it leaves too little room for differences arising from 
legitimate forms of democratic decision-making. 
 
4.1 Assessing Environmental Inequalities Based on the Formal-Procedural Account 
As mentioned in section three, proponents of the formal-procedural account are chiefly worried 
about the protection of people's basic rights and their associated liberties. Thus, the formal-
23 / 35 
procedural account only objects to inequalities, no matter whether social or environmental, 
which directly undermine a person's formal status and rights. In other words, our geographies 
of risk, which we outlined in section two, are often – from the viewpoint of a formal-procedural 
understanding of justice and democratic citizenship – of very limited use unless they directly 
undermine a citizen's basic formal rights and liberties.  
That is to say, if some members of society suffer from higher exposure to non-lethal 
toxins and bad air quality, a defender of the formal-procedural account would not call such a 
state of affairs unjust, unless this exposure directly undermined the people's ability to exercise 
their most basic formal rights and liberties, for instance through causing premature death. Of 
course, existing theories can be more or less strict with regard to upholding their formal-pro-
cedural understanding of justice, meaning that some theories might object to all those environ-
mental inequalities which (in a meaningful manner) statistically correlate with lower life ex-
pectancy. However, even if one were to include such cases (and they are extremely difficult to 
prove, i.e. to show beyond the shadow of a doubt that unjust exposure to a toxin on its own 
caused premature death), overall, on a purely formal-procedural reading most environmental 
inequalities and their associated geographies of risk would prove normatively unobjectionable.  
The formal-procedural account does not see the correlation of geographies of exposure 
and geographies of vulnerability as a worrisome indicator for the existence of distinct geogra-
phies of risk, which unearth the cumulative effects of environmental and socio-economic dis-
advantage. This is especially true if disadvantaged members of society had the possibility to 
vote, for example, on where to place a waste-site, since if they had the formal possibility to 
take part in such decision-making any decision being a result of majority voting would have to 
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be seen as legitimate. In other words, the formal-procedural account worries about the (non)ex-
istence of people’s formal rights to democratic citizenship but not the substantial quality and 
value of these rights.15 
While a formal-procedural position is of course logically consistent and legitimate, we 
think that such an assessment of the deontic status of socio-environmental inequalities would 
in many cases add insult to injury for those suffering from multiple and cumulative forms of 
disadvantage, exposure and vulnerability. To claim that everything is fine unless people are – 
due to environmental exposure – too sick to vote or more generally speaking too sick to perform 
their basic formal rights and liberties seems rather cynical. Moreover, there seems to be some-
thing objectionable about vast environmental inequalities which negatively impact people's 
lives and their well-being, even if these inequalities were legitimised through a democratic 
vote. This is particularly true in cases in which certain minority groups in society would suffer 
from political domination by a majority. 
 
4.2 Assessing Environmental Inequalities Based on the Comprehensive-Substantive Account 
Assessing environmental inequalities through the lens of the comprehensive-substantive ac-
count leads to problems at the opposite end of the scale. The preconditions for democratic 
citizenship which the comprehensive-substantive account sets out are simply too demanding, 
since the idealistic conception of justice it is based upon calls for a far-reaching re-invention 
of society. To ensure free and equal citizenship it would not only be necessary to correct most 
social-economic inequalities but from an environmental justice perspective to change most past 
policy decisions on how to allocate the benefits and burdens (including risks) of different en-
vironmental factors, such as exposure to toxins and the like. 
                                                            
15 See Daniels (1975). 
25 / 35 
This is especially problematic in the case of environmental decisions concerning the 
distribution of waste-sites or exposure to toxins. Since it is due to technical or safety reasons 
nearly impossible to geographically distribute these sites in a way not being in conflict with 
comprehensive egalitarian principles of distributive justice, any slightly unequal distribution 
across a society's geographies of risk would have to be deemed initially objectionable, meaning 
that a society which distributes some risks unequally would have to compensate its disadvan-
taged citizens through other means.16 This is problematic for two reasons: First, assessing en-
vironmental inequalities from the perspective of the comprehensive-substantive account be-
comes almost impossible, since it calls for more or less constant re-distributions within and 
beyond geographies of risk, which might simply not be realizable in practice. Second, even if 
one were able to constantly re-distribute, such a scheme seems to call for a huge state apparatus 
to administer the measurement of seemingly small socio-environmental differences and the 
ensuing re-distribution. 
Therefore, while the comprehensive-substantive account might give us an attractive ac-
count of what an ideal society of equals in socio-economic and environmental terms could look 
like, its normative vision is too ideal and demanding in order to provide a good basis for nor-
mative assessment of real world socio-environmental inequalities. Since the aim of this paper 
was to bring together empirical research with normative theory, in our view it would seem odd 
to argue for a normative framework in which virtually all inequalities, no matter whether social 
or environmental, would prove objectionable and unjust. What seems to be more plausible in 
order to assess social and environmental inequalities, therefore, is a less demanding account 
than the comprehensive-substantive account, but an account which is substantive enough not 
to render all social and environmental inequalities irrelevant. 
                                                            
16 In fact, defenders of the comprehensive‐substantive account see already differential geographies of expo‐
sure as objectionable, independent of whether unequal exposure tracks socio‐economic inequalities and vice 
versa. 
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4.3. Assessing Environmental Inequalities Based on the Moderately Demanding Social-Egali-
tarian Account 
The moderately demanding social egalitarian account offers us a normative framework which 
works well with our geographies of socio-environmental risk, since it allows us to differentiate 
between different forms of inequality and their effects. The reason why the social-egalitarian 
framework is most useful is that it is, on the one hand, demanding enough, since it lays out 
quite strict conditions for protecting people’s equal social status and especially their right to 
free and equal citizenship, while on the other hand, it is flexible enough to allow for both dem-
ocratic self-determination and the existence of legitimate inequalities.  
If, for instance, all members of society took a vote on where to build a new waste treat-
ment facility, and if the background conditions for this vote had been just and all citizens had 
indeed been able to participate as free and equal citizens, then social-egalitarians would have 
no issue with the facility being built in location A rather than location B, even if the eventual 
building site was located close to a socio-economically disadvantaged part of town. If however 
the result of the vote on where to build the waste treatment facility had been compromised by 
underlying socio-economic inequalities, such as strong lobbying efforts by the rich to build the 
facility on a site close to a disadvantaged part of town, social egalitarians would argue that such 
a vote’s result is illegitimate.  
Since members of the disadvantaged part of town had neither the means to campaign 
for their interests nor adequate information on the long-term effects of the facility on health, 
according to social egalitarians these equal democratic citizenship undermining differences 
must be deemed unjust. Moreover, social egalitarians would object to the fact that the disad-
vantaged are already amongst the most vulnerable and susceptible members of society, a state 
of affairs exacerbated by the result of the vote and thus heightening existing inequalities with 
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regard to the geography of risk, since exposure would now seem to track socio-economic dis-
advantage. Therefore, on a social-egalitarian reading, in this second case, the vote as well as 
the placement of the waste treatment facility would be considered unjust.  
As this example shows, in contrast to the formal-procedural account the moderately 
demanding social-egalitarian conception of justice and democratic citizenship allows to distin-
guish between different grounds on the basis of which we might deem certain inequalities ob-
jectionable, or not. At the same time, the social-egalitarian framework is not as idealist and 
demanding as the comprehensive-substantive account. Therefore, according to the moderately 
demanding reading not all environmental inequalities undermine free and equal citizenship. 
This is a crucial point which relates back to the discussion of the empirical literature in part 
two and shows why we think it is important to identify distinct geographies of risk, rather than 
just isolated inequalities of exposure or proximity.  
Through combining the results of empirical studies on differential exposure and on 
complex and multiple socio-economic vulnerability, geographies of risk highlight the nexus 
between 'purely' environmental aspects and social, political and economic aspects, which in 
combination can very much undermine a person's status as a free and equal citizen. The mod-
erately demanding social-egalitarian account is uniquely able to pick up on the existence of 
harmful geographies of risk by problematizing instances of unequal political influence, socio-
economic domination and illegitimate differences in risk exposure. The social-egalitarian ac-
count is interested in both the substantive conditions for free and equal citizenship and the 
legitimate authority of democracy, that is, the justifiability of political decision-making to all 
relevant parties. It is because of this twofold scope that the moderately demanding social-egal-
itarian account is not only best suited to assessing the normative status of existing environmen-
tal inequalities, but also to explaining why – if we take our bearing from existing empirical 
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research – we should consider many environmental inequalities to be indeed unjust but others 
to be legitimate. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to link empirical findings concerning environmental inequalities 
with different possible normative yard-sticks for assessing these inequalities and to judge 
whether certain environmental inequalities should be deemed unjust, or not. As we pointed out 
in section one such an inquiry must necessarily take into account some caveats regarding both 
empirical research and normative theory. We argued that contextualising the results found in 
the empirical literature within the wider research on inequality and social disadvantage, and 
studying significant overlaps between geographies of exposure and geographies of vulnerabil-
ity allows us to derive normatively relevant geographies of risk, which track relevant inequal-
ities across different dimensions.  
We then shifted our attention to the question of what kind of normative accounts of 
justice and democratic citizenship might help us in evaluating which environmental inequali-
ties represent socio-environmental injustices. After reviewing three paradigmatic accounts, we 
argued for utilising a moderately demanding social-egalitarian account of justice and demo-
cratic citizenship for identifying unjust instances of socio-environmental inequality. As our 
analysis in section four showed, a moderately demanding social-egalitarian framework enables 
researchers to carefully disentangle the different grounds on which geographies of risk, respec-
tively which socio-environmental inequalities, might be deemed unjust and under what condi-
tions they must be accepted as legitimate. Moreover, establishing distinct geographies of risk 
allows researchers to uncover the often harmful nexus between multiple and partially cumula-
tive forms of social, economic and environmental disadvantage. It is only by combining results 
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on differences in exposure with results on varying vulnerability that we arrive at a proper un-
derstanding of social and environmental risk, which in turn enables us to make, based on a 
suitable normative framework, an informed and critical assessment of an inequality's deontic 
status.  
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